The writer is a researcher at the trkiye research foundation. us secretary of state marco rubio has officially signed off on removing syria from the state sponsors of terrorism list:ay congressional review period. The move stems from US President Donald Trump's decision, which was made after meeting with Syrian President Ahmad Sharaa at the 36th NATO Summit in Ankara in July.
According to Anadolu Agency, this marks a major victory for the Damascus administration, which has made strides in global diplomatic and economic integration since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. An Israeli strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase near Idlib reaffirmed that Israel remains the primary threat to Syria's reconstruction and post-civil war recovery in this new era. Meanwhile, in a separate domestic development, Ferhat Abdi Sahin - ringleader of the former SDF, operating under the code name Mazloum Abdi - announced the dissolution of the SDF on the evening of Aug. 25, declaring the integration process complete.
These developments, most notably Washington's decision to remove Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, amount to much more than the mere lifting of sanctions. They signal that post-Assad Syria is rapidly gaining momentum as an integrated player in the new regional order.
The US removal of Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list means the end of a status that has continued since 1979. While this decision reveals that Damascus is no longer classified by the US as part of state-sponsored terrorism, it removes a significant legal and political obstacle for Syria, particularly regarding financial transactions, international banking, investments, and economic relations.
Syria's removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list should be read as a political and diplomatic victory prior to its economic consequences. The significance of the decision can be understood more clearly when considering the list's other members, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and keeping in mind that Syria was the country that remained on the list the longest. Therefore, being on this list is valuable in terms of seeing how the US positions a country in the international system, even before economic sanctions. Consequently, Syria's removal from the list serves as a declaration of the kind of relationship the Trump administration wants to establish with Damascus.
For Syria, the second and perhaps most concrete dimension of the decision is economic. The US decision to remove Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list constitutes one of the final major steps necessary for previously lifted sanctions to translate into meaningful economic gains. This is because a significant portion of the legal and financial uncertainties preventing the private sector and international capital from entering Syria has now been eliminated.
A new era is beginning for Syria, particularly regarding banking transactions and reintegration into the global financial system. Given that approximately $260 billion is needed for Syria's reconstruction, this decision is critical for implementing existing investment agreements, accelerating new ones, and allowing the economy to recover and erase the scars of the civil war.
However, it should be noted that the lifting of sanctions does not automatically guarantee an influx of investment into the country. This process must be built on a sound foundation through new legal regulations, particularly in banking, finance, and foreign investment.
The decision also entails the removal of significant barriers restricting US civilian aid, military sales, and the transfer of dual-use technologies to Syria. More importantly, it eliminates one of the primary legal hurdles preventing Washington from providing military assistance to Syria or signing a future military agreement. This demonstrates that beyond its economic impact, the decision opens a new door for Damascus's integration into the international system in the fields of security and defense.
Developments unfolding in and around Syria around the time the decision took effect indicate that this is also part of a broader struggle over the country's future. While the Israeli strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase revealed that security risks capable of undermining Syria's diplomatic integration and reconstruction process still persist, the US Congress's failure to raise any objections during the 45-day review period was a notable development regarding the political balance in Washington. This shows that no overt political resistance to the Trump administration's Syria policy materialized, even in a Congress influenced by pro-Israel circles. It can be argued that lawmakers, particularly those navigating a midterm election cycle, were hesitant to openly oppose or contradict Trump's decision.
The local dimension of these developments involves the decision to dissolve the SDF. In the face of the Damascus administration's efforts to restore the country's territorial integrity, the shift in US policy on Syria has created a new equation for the SDF as well.
In an equation where Washington prefers to work with the Syrian central government, it was no longer possible for the organization, having also lost its occupation zones east of the Euphrates, to maintain its existence as an independent political-military entity.
This process ultimately concluded with Abdi's announcement that the organization had been dissolved. Thus, while the SDF issue, which stood as one of the greatest threats to Syria's unitary state structure, has been largely resolved, the possibility of Israel operationalizing the terror organization in pursuit of its vision of an unstable Syria has also been largely eliminated.
Nevertheless, considering that Israel's occupation and offensive operations in southern Syria continue, the risks remain active. On the same day, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz's visit to the occupied Jabal al-Sheikh, the protests by separatist Druze circles in Suwayda, and Hikmat al-Hijri's statement that they are an "inseparable part" of Israel demonstrate that the issue facing Syria is not merely about economic restructuring.
The decision also holds distinct significance for Trkiye. The shift in US policy on Syria significantly aligns with Ankara's vision for Syria and the region. It is also symbolically noteworthy that the decision came following the meeting between Trump and Sharaa, who was in Ankara for the NATO Summit. Washington's policy of reintegrating Syria into the international system parallels Trkiye's goals of preserving Syria's territorial integrity, strengthening its central state structure, and economically revitalizing the country.
Reactions to the Abu al-Duhur strike reveal a growing divergence between Israel's approach and the strategic value the US assigns to Syria within its broader regional vision. Despite Israel lobbying over the past 18 months to tether the lifting of sanctions to specific conditions, Washington has consistently advanced measures favoring Damascus. The repeal of the Caesar Act and this latest delisting clearly underscore that Washington has made a strategic calculation to forge a new relationship with Damascus, effectively curtailing Israeli leverage over this decision. Furthermore, the critical posture adopted by Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria, toward the Abu al-Duhur strike, specifically his warning that the attack heightens the risk of conflict with Trkiye, can be read as an explicit pushback against Israel and the Netanyahu administration.
Ultimately, the removal of the final US sanctions on Syria constitutes a renewed diplomatic triumph for Damascus and Ankara, while signaling yet another setback for Tel Aviv's objectives in the Syrian arena. Looking ahead, augmented by diplomatic, economic, and potential military backing from Trkiye, the US, and regional actors, we are likely to witness substantial progress in Syria's national reconstruction, particularly concerning the separatist Druze challenge in Suwayda.