Brussels: The Trump administration's recent isolationist statements, amid the talks of war in Europe, have revived discussions on Europeanizing French (and possibly British) nuclear weapons. After 75 years of NATO, concerns over US abandonment are increasingly shaping European foreign policy discussions. In the past, the French idea of a "dissuasion concert©e" (concerted deterrence) was mostly met with silence, especially in Germany. This time around, the conservative leader Friedrich Merz seems in favor despite the fact that NATO is still alive and the US still has 100,000 soldiers and 100 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons are stationed in Trkiye, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. If the soldiers or the tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn, the odds are that the Europeanization of the French (and maybe British) nuclear weapons in one way or another may indeed become reality.

According to Anadolu Agency, there are different scenarios imaginable. The first step is for European nuclear states to declare that their "national interests" align with "European interests," a principle already reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, which also contains a collective defense clause similar to NATO's Article 5. Further steps could be imagined to make these statements more credible: information exchange, consultation, joint planning, joint exercises, and co-financing. Another step could involve deploying French dual-capable aircraft in Germany or Poland. A final step would be the creation of an EU nuclear bomb in a European Defense Union (EDU). It remains, however, still to be seen how the Ukraine war will accelerate the pace towards such an EDU.

The costs of Europeanizing nuclear weapons are multifaceted. Firstly, the assumption that nuclear deterrence works is uncertain. Advocates of nuclear weapons believe in its efficacy, but historical instances show that nuclear-armed states have been attacked by non-nuclear states. The theory of nuclear deterrence assumes rational behavior from adversaries and the willingness to use nuclear weapons, which could lead to catastrophic consequences.

Secondly, emerging technologies like AI and hypersonic missiles could undermine nuclear stability. Ideally, conventional deterrence could replace nuclear deterrence if nuclear states agree, but this remains a contentious topic.

Thirdly, extended nuclear deterrence, or the nuclear umbrella, is questioned for its credibility. Historically, there have been doubts about the US's willingness to use nuclear weapons for European defense. This skepticism led France to develop its own arsenal, and now, ironically, it offers its umbrella to European partners.

Fourthly, without an EDU, there are concerns over control. French President Macron insists on maintaining control, raising questions about the willingness of other European nations to co-finance a system they do not control.

Fifthly, Europeanizing French nuclear weapons could legitimize nuclear arsenals, complicating non-proliferation efforts. It raises questions about the EU's stance on nuclear proliferation treaties and the consistency of its policies.

Finally, there is an argument for prioritizing diplomacy over military expansion. The ongoing Ukraine conflict highlights the need for diplomatic resolutions and restructuring European security frameworks to include both Russia and Ukraine. The focus should be on coordination and efficiency rather than expanding nuclear capabilities, as European defense spending already surpasses that of Russia.

In conclusion, the Europeanization of nuclear weapons presents complex challenges and considerations, both politically and ethically, that require careful deliberation and strategic diplomacy.