Nicosia: The Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) has entered a new agreement with Lebanon to redefine their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries. This agreement follows similar arrangements GCASC has made with Israel and Egypt. On November 26, GCASC leader Nikos Christodoulides and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signed the delimitation agreement. The deal uses the southern boundary between Lebanon and Israel, as well as the northern boundary between Lebanon and Syria, as reference points to redefine the GCASC-Lebanon EEZ limits through the "median line" method. The tripoint where the maritime zones of GCASC, Lebanon, and Syria intersect has also been identified.
According to Anadolu Agency, the agreement is touted as strategically important because it provides legal certainty for investors in regional energy projects. However, it has been criticized for resulting in a disproportionate distribution of maritime space that disadvantages Lebanon. Critics within Lebanon argue that the arrangement amounts to a "concession of sovereignty" and a "strategic mistake," leading to the loss of approximately 5,000 km² of maritime area.
Despite assurances from Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that the cooperation "excludes no one," reactions from Trkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have been negative. Trkiye claims that the so-called "Republic of Cyprus" continues to overlook Turkish Cypriots-co-equal partners on the island-and ignore Trkiye, which has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean. TRNC authorities also emphasized that GCASC does not represent Turkish Cypriots and cannot make unilateral decisions affecting the entire island, declaring the agreement "null and void."
The European Union's involvement is also notable. Following the 2020 explosion at the Port of Beirut, Lebanon has relied heavily on Western financial assistance. There are indications that the EU's planned pound 1 billion aid package is politically tied to the signing of this agreement. GCASC is expected to take an active role in Lebanon under the "Mediterranean Agreement," which may be announced during its term as holder of the EU Council Presidency.
The GCASC-Lebanon agreement is anticipated to accelerate hydrocarbon exploration in the region, advance international energy projects, and encourage the EU to pursue new natural gas and energy corridors. This could negatively impact Trkiye's energy policies, while enabling GCASC to strengthen energy cooperation with Egypt, Israel, and other regional players. By bypassing Trkiye and the TRNC, the EU may seek new energy, electricity, and infrastructure linkages through GCASC, Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon, challenging Trkiye's ambition to be an "energy hub." The deal may also pave the way for a future delimitation agreement between GCASC and Syria.
Furthermore, the agreement appears to be part of the Greek Cypriot side's efforts to undermine the sovereign rights of Turkish Cypriots. It is argued that the deal violates Turkish Cypriots' legitimate rights, disrupting the fragile equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, jeopardizing shared visions for cooperation, and undermining the principle of equal rights, thereby increasing the risk of conflict.
Though the areas covered by the agreement are outside the Turkish continental shelf registered before the UN in March 2020, it disregards Turkish Cypriots' rights and is likely to hinder intercommunal negotiations sought by newly elected TRNC President Tufan Erhurman, adversely affecting the Cyprus question.
Possible responses from Trkiye and the TRNC include political, diplomatic, and technical measures. The TRNC may redeclare its licensing zones, corresponding to areas declared by GCASC, to demonstrate Turkish Cypriots' sovereign equality and affirm that unilateral actions will not go unanswered. For Trkiye, concluding a maritime delimitation agreement with Syria based on the 2011 continental shelf delimitation with the TRNC could be a significant step.
The fundamental issue lies in GCASC's unilateral EEZ declaration, ignoring Turkish Cypriots and Trkiye, constituting an unlawful act. The UN General Assembly's 1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources states that "natural resources belong to the peoples of the territory," highlighting the Greek Cypriot administration's usurpation of Turkish Cypriots' rights.
The validity of GCASC's EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007, and Israel in 2010 forms the core of current disputes. The Greek Cypriots' control of the "Republic of Cyprus" since 1963 and their EEZ declarations aim to legitimize their position, which is viewed as an occupying administration.
Looking ahead, GCASC's final maritime delimitation agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean is expected to be with Syria, potentially realized with the EU and US's political backing. If successful, GCASC would further consolidate its role as a regional actor, supported by external partners.
Ultimately, GCASC's policies that disregard TRNC and Turkish Cypriots could hinder peace and stability on the island, while transforming the region into a hub for third-party military actors, thereby fueling instability. Establishing a mutually acceptable settlement in Cyprus and fostering regional stability becomes increasingly challenging.